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ABSTRACT 
This paper constructs an equilibrium model by formalizing a trade-off between the gains 
from trade based on increasing returns to specialization and transaction costs. The 
1 ·relationship between development, structural changes, and urbanization is investigated. In 
addition, the function of a free market in searching for the efficient market structure is 
explored. 
Introduction 
As far as the problem of production was concerned, Adam Smith [1776] and 
Allyn Young [1928] emphasized the productivity implications of economic 
organization (the division of labor). Neoclassical microeconomics cannot explore 
such implications for the following reason. For production functions with 
constant returns to scale, an agent's productivity of a good is not greater when 
he produces only this good than when he produces many goods. On the other hand, 
production functions with increasing returns to scale cannot be used to 
characterize the level of specialization within a firm. The concept of economies 
of scale presupposes a complete separation of pure consumers from pure producers. 
11 Scale II relates to a firm which is a pure producer, but is irrelevant to a pure 
consumer. 
The separation of pure producers from pure consumers is a basis of Debreu's 
theoretical framework and neoclassical microeconomics. This artificial separation 
has perhaps misled economic theory. In autarky, there is neither a pure consumer 
nor a pure producer; each individual is a producer/consumer. The division of 
labor will increase the portion of a person's production that is not consumed by 
himself (i.e. the portion sold to other people) and increase the portion of a 
person's consumption that is not produced by himself (i.e. the portion purchased 
from other people). We can view this change as an increase in the degree of 
separation between production and consumption though each person is a 
producer/consumer even in the division of labor. The degree of such separation 
depends on the level of division of labor (or inversely on the degree of 
self-sufficiency). As to endogenizing the level of division of labor and thereby 
the degree of such separation, Debreu' s framework is irrelevant since in his 
framework, pure consumers are completely separated from pure producers and the 
degree of the separation of consumption from production cannot be defined. 
In order to capture the ideas of Smith and Young, this paper specifies 
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production functions for each producer/consumer such that an individual's 
produc tivi ty increases with the level of specialization and the aggregate 
transformation curve for the whole economy depends positively on the level of 
division of labor. 
There are several implications of this method of specifying production 
functions for the theory of equilibrium. First, each individual is a 
producer/consumer. He must decide how many goods are self-provided, i.e. what is 
the level of specialization. Hence, the model in this paper can be used to 
endogenize the level of division of labor. According to conventional 
microeconomics, pure consumers cannot choose the level of specialization since 
they must buy all goods from firms. 
Second, a Cobb-Douglas utility function is specified for each 
producer/consumer. Consequently each individual as a consumer prefers diverse 
consumption and as a producer prefers specialized production. This implies that 
the division of labor will incur great transaction costs. Therefore, there is a 
trade-off between economies of specialization and transaction costs. In other 
words, our method of specifying production functions makes the level of division 
of labor crucial for productivity; while transaction efficiency is critical for 
the determination of the level of division of labor. Because of increasing 
returns to specialization, the production possibility frontier (PPF) is 
associated with extreme specialization. Extreme specialization will, however, 
incur prohibitively great transaction costs since people prefer diverse 
consumption. Hence, the welfare frontier may differ from the PPF . 1 A natural 
conjecture is that a competitive equilibrium will balance the trade-off between 
economies of specialization and transaction costs, and that improvement of 
transaction efficiency will_ move the equilibrium closer to the PPF, resulting in 
an increase in the division of labor. The major purpose of this paper is to prove 
this conjecture. In other words, Smith's conjecture of the "invisible hand" and 
his insights into increasing returns to specialization will be reconciled in this 
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paper. 
A crucial assumption leading to this result is that labor is specific for 
each person who is able to produce all goods. This assumption combined with the 
assumption of free entry ensures the first welfare theorem even if there exist 
increasing returns to specialization. Intuitively, we can see that if increasing 
returns to specialization are specific for each individual, economies of scale 
are limited. Since production functions are specified for each producer/consumer, 
prices are determined by the numbers of individuals selling different goods. This 
number cannot be manipulated by any individual because of the assumption of free 
entry and the assumption that each person is able to produce all goods. Hence, 
nobody is able to manipulate prices. Nevertheless, if labor can be divided in 
fine detail and the population size is very large, economies of division of labor 
may be very large. Hence, a competitive market may be compatible with the 
substantial economies of the division of labor. Therefore, we can use this method 
to develop the concepts of equilibrium and Pareto optimum in relation not only to 
the resource allocation for a given level of division of labor, but also to the 
determination of the level of division of labor and productivity. 
The implications of this method for other fields of economic analysis are 
important. The level of division of labor based on increasing returns to 
specialization is intimately related to the extent of market, trade dependence, 
trade pattern, market structure, and economic structure, so these can be made 
endogenous in our model. Productivity is related to the level of division of 
labor which depends on transaction efficiency, which is in turn affected by 
urbanization, government policies, and institutional arrangements. Hence, our 
model can be used to investigate the impacts of urbanization, government 
policies, and institutional arrangements on the equilibrium level of division of 
labor (related to the market structure, trade dependence, and so on) and 
productivity. This paper shows that the equilibrium trade volume depends 
positively on the absolute degree of increasing returns to specialization in 
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production and transaction, and negatively on the average distance between a pair 
of neighbors. The trade pattern is determined by the relative degree of 
increasing returns to specialization in producing different goods and relative 
preference for different goods. In addition, it is shown that increases in 
diversification of the economic structure, concentration of production, 
integration of the economy, specialization, and the output share of roundabout 
productive activities are different versions of the evolution of division of 
labor resulting from improvements of transaction efficiency which are in turn 
caused by urbanization, liberalization policies, or changes in institutional 
arrangements. 
Many economists have proposed similar ideas. Nevertheless few among them have 
been successful in formalizing them. On the other hand, the formal models 
proposed by mainstream economists are often inconsistent with these ideas. This 
may be due to the difficulty of formalizing the ideas of Smith and Young. For 
example, many economists (see, e.g. Helpman and Krugman [1985) and Herberg and 
Tawada [1982]) point to problems which are considered to make an equilibrium 
model with increasing returns to specialization and transaction costs 
unmanageable. Such problems include the issue of corner solutions based on 
increasing returns to specialization, the problem of infinite combinations of 
individual corner solutions in solving for equilibrium, notorious complications 
in dealing with indexe·s of variables in models with transaction costs, and the 
problem of existence of equilibrium. Formalizing the notion of increasing returns 
to scale is much easier than formalizing the notion of increasing returns to 
specialization. This might explain why it is hard to find microeconomic 
equilibrium models that formalize the theory of production proposed by Smith and 
Young. 
In this paper, we try to formalize the essence of the ideas of Smith and 
Young as well as to keep an equilibrium model tractable. Our techniques for 
achieving these two goals are to specify a specific transaction technology and to 
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devise a multiple-step approach to handling the issue of combinations of corner 
solutions. In order to get around the problem of the existence of equilibrium, we 
propose a specific model. Using this model, we can prove the existence of 
equilibrium although it is impossible to reach a general conclusion on this issue 
for a model with increasing returns to specialization. 
Fortunately, these measures are not only effective in keeping the model 
tractable, but also useful in working out the meaningful comparative statics of 
equilibrium. Many interesting economic phenomena which are not addressed in the 
conventional theory can be explained by the kind of model in this paper. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section I sets out a model with three 
goods. Sections II-VI develop a multiple-step approach to handling the model with 
increasing returns to specialization. Section II solves for the corner solutions 
for the individual decision problem. Section III solves for all candidates for 
equilibrium in various market structures. Section IV solves for the restricted 
Pareto optimum in each market structure and the full Pareto optimum. Section V 
investigates the relationship between equilibria and the Pareto optima. Section 
VI solves for an equilibrium and investigates its comparative statics. Some 
simple conclusions are summarized in the final section. 
I A Model with Three Goods 
Let us first consider an economy with M consumers/producers and 3 consumer 
goods. The self-provided amounts of these goods are x, y, and z, respectively. By 
self-provided we shall mean that quantity of a good produced by an individual for 
his own consumption. The amounts of these goods sold at the market are xs, ys, 
and zs, respectively. The amounts of these goods purchased in the market are xd, 
yd, and zd, respectively. An "iceberg" type of transaction technology is 
characterized by the coefficient k. Fraction k of a shipment disappears in 
transportation. Thus, (1-k)xd, (1-k)yd, and (1-k)zd are the amounts a person 
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receives from the purchases of three goods, respectively. 
Furthermore, we assume that (1-k) depends on the quantity of labor used in 
transaction. (1-k) can be viewed as transaction service. Such services are 
categorized into self-provided ones and traded ones. Let 1-k = T + Td where Tis 
the self-provided quantity of transaction service and Td is the quantity 
purchased of transaction service. The more transaction service T+Td, the greater 
portion of a purchase is received by its buyer. Here, T+Td s 1. Signifying the 
quantity sold of transaction service by Ts, transaction technology and production 
functions are thus given by 
(I-la) x+xs y+ys z+zs 
where x+xs, y+ys, z+zs, and T+Ts are the output levels of four goods and service, 
respectively. Ls is the amount of labor used in producing good (or service) s 
wheres= x, y, z, T. (I-1) is assumed to be identical for all individuals. In 
such iso-elasticity production functions parameters a, b, c, and t characterize 
the returns to specialization. If a, b, c, t > 1, then there are increasing 
returns to specialization. Adopting the concept of localized technology proposed 
by Sah and Stiglitz [1986], we assume that the total quantity of labor available 
for an individual is specific for him. Let this quantity be one; there is an 
endowment constraint of the specific labor for an individual 
(I-lb) 1, i x, y, z, T 
This method of specifying production functions is substantially different from 
the conventional one. This system of production functions differs from the 
production functions associated with the U-shaped average cost curve and those 
with global increasing returns to scale. The production possibility frontier 
(PPF) of this system of production functions is associated with extreme 
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specialization. Therefore, if there is no transaction cost, equilibrium is the 
extreme division of labor (each individual has extreme specialization and 
different individuals specialize in producing different goods). 
In our model the reason that people prefer some division of labor is that 
internal economies of scale are very limited because labor is specific for each 
individual. This point distinguishes increasing returns to specialization from 
increasing returns to scale. 
Assume, further, that the transaction service T (or Td) is related only to 
the quantity traded and there are transaction costs related to the distance 
between a pair of trade partners; thus there is a location problem. Suppose that 
all people are evenly located and the geographic distance between a pair of 
neighbors is a constant. The distance between a pair of trade partners may differ 
from the distance between a pair of neighbors. If all trade partners of an 
individual are located in a circle with radius R and with his location as the 
origin, it can be shown that the average distance between this individual and his 
trade partners is proportional to Rand the number of these trade partners N is 
proportional to R2 . Hence, the average distance between this individual and his 
trade partners is proportional to jN. If all the trade partners supply different 
goods to this individual, the number of traded goods for him is n = N+1. For 
simplicity, we assume that the number of trade partners of an individual, N = n -
1, where n is the number of traded goods for him. 
Assume that the transaction cost coefficient K characterizes the transaction 
cost related to the average distance between a pair of trade partners; then the K 
fraction of (T+Td)xd or (T+Td)yd, or (T+Td)zd disappears on the way from a seller 
to a buyer. The relation between K and the number of trade partners of an 
individual, N, is given by 
(I-2) K sjN 
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wheres is a constant depending on the distance between a pair of neighbors and 
1r. Taking (I-2) into account, the amounts consumed of the three goods are 
x+(l-K)(T+Td)xd, y+(l-K)(T+Td)yd, and z+(l-K)(T+Td)zd, respectively. The utility 
function is identical for all individuals: 
(I-3) u 
where O < a, fi, 7 < 1 and a+ fi + 7 = 1. The maximal value of T+Td is 1. 
We assume free entry for all individuals into any sector and that Mis large. 
These assumptions imply that individuals treat prices parametrically. 
II. The Individual Optimal Decision 
This section and the four sections to follow are devoted to devising a 
multiple-step approach to handling the model with increasing returns to 
specialization. In our model, the individual decision problem implicitly includes 
three problems: to choose the optimum level of specialization (in other words, 
the optimal number of traded goods is a decision variable), to choose the optimal 
composition of traded goods, and to choose the optimal quantities of consumption, 
production, and trade. This problem is unmanageable in a step. 
If there are increasing returns, some variables will take zero values in the 
individual optimal decision and in equilibrium. Hence, an individual needs to 
enumerate all possible combinations of zero and non-zero variables before 
identifying his optimal decision. Also we need to enumerate all possible 
combinations of these individual combinations of zero and non-zero variables 
before identifying the Pareto optimum and equilibrium although we can exclude 
some of these combinations from the list of candidates for equilibrium by 
application of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem (as shown in Appendix 1). 
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There are five steps in solving for equilibrium. This section will solve for 
individually rational decisions for given prices and for each combination of zero 
and non-zero variables. Section III solves for the candidate for equilibrium (or 
corner equilibrium) for each combination of the above individual combinations. 
Section IV solves for the Pareto optimum candidate for equilibrium. Section V 
investigates the relationship between equilibrium and the Pareto optimum. 
Finally, equilibrium and its comparative statics are solved. 
The individual decision problem is 
(II-1) Max: U 
s.t. x+xs = ~ y+ys i; z+zs = L~ (production function) 
T +Ts= L¥ (transaction technology) 
Lx. +Ly+ Lz + q 1 (endowment constraint) 
p Ts+ PxXs+ PyYs+ PzZs = p Td+ PxXd+ PyYd+ PzZd (trade balance) 
T T 
where i, 1 
·S 
' id, and Li (i = x, y, z, T) are decision variables, which may take 
on zero or positive values. Pi is the price of good (or service) i. 
If a, b, c, t > 1, the optimal decision is certainly a corner solution. By 
combination of zero and non-zero values of the variables, there are several 
possible corner solutions. We shall call such a combination a II s·tructure. 11 An 
individual needs to enumerate and compare utilities in all structures before 
choosing a structure. Therefore, an individual must solve for the corner 
solutions for each structure and his decision making process consists of two 
stages. In the first stage all structures are enumerated. An individual solves 
for the efficient allocation (how much should be produced, consumed, and traded 
of each good) for given prices and for each structure. In the second stage, he 
decides what should be produced, and what should be sold and purchased, i.e. 
2which structure should be chosen. Section III will discuss this problem. 
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There are 29 structures of four general types: 
(1) Autarky (x,y,z), i.e. an individual self-provides three goods. For this 
structure 
0Lr 
In other words, the amounts sold and purchased of the three goods are zero, as 
are the amounts sold, purchased, and self-provided of transaction services. 
(2) Structure (i/j), i.e. an individual sells good (or service) i and 
purchases good (or service) j, i,j = x,y,z,T. For such structures 
j 0 for k 'F i, j 
where index k denote the goods other than goods i and j . By 2 permutations of 
four factors, we obtain 12 structures of this type: (x/y), (y/x), (x/z), (z/x), 
(y/z), (z/y), (T/x), (x/T), (T/y), (y/T), (T/z), and (z/T). 
(3) Structure (i/jk), i.e. an individual sells good (or service) i and 
purchases goods (or service) j and k. i, j, k = x, y, z, T. For such structures 
j 0 for r 'Fi, j, k 
where index r denote the goods other than goods i, j , and k. There are 12 
structures of this type: (x/yz), (x/yT), (x/zT), (y/xz), (y/xT), (y/zT), (z/xy), 
(z/xT), (z/yT), (T/xy), (T/xz), and (T/yz). 
(4) Structure (i/jkr), i.e. an individual sells good (or service) i and 
purchases goods (or service) j, k, and r, i, j, k, r = x, y, z, T. For such 
structures 
j k = r 0 for j, k, r 'Fi 
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There are four structures of this type: (x/yzT), (y/xzT), (z/xyT), (T/xyz). 
Appendix 1 has proven 
Proposition 1 
According to the necessary condition for an optimum decision, an individual 
does not produce and purchase a good at the same time, and sells only one good 
(if any). 
This proposition implies that the remaining structures, e.g., (ijk/ijk), (ij/jk), 
(ij/k), etc. do not satisfy the necessary condition for maximizing individual 
utility. Hence, these structures will not be concerned. Letting the relevant 
variables in problem (II-1) take on a zero value, an individual can solve for his 
optimal decisions for each structure. These individual decisions include 
individual supply, which is a constant depending on a, b, c, a, p, ~. t, ands, 
and individual demand, depending positively on the relative prices of the goods 
he sells to the goods he purchases, and his supply. Inserting the individual 
optimal decision for each structure and for given prices into the utility 
function gives an indirect utility function for each structure. The indirect 
utility functions differ from structure to structure although the original 
utility function is identical for all individuals. In an indirect utility 
function, the number of relative prices is one less than the number of traded 
goods. Here there are 29 alternative structures for each individual that might be 
rational. 
III. The Markets and Candidates for Equilibrium (Gomer Equilibria) 
As in solving for the individual decisions, if there are increasing returns, 






(a) Market P (b) Market B 
Figure 1 
equilibrium and the Pareto optimum. This section first investigates how 
structures are combined to constitute markets. We will then enumerate all 
combinations of structures and solve for the "candidates" for equilibrium (corner 
equilibrium). The corner equilibrium is an analogue to the corner solution in the 
optimization problem for an individual. It is a concept used to solve for the 
equilibrium in a calculation of several steps. Of course, a corner equilibrium 
3would never come into being if it was not a full equilibrium. 
Defining a combination of several mutually consistent structures as a market, 
there are many market configurations, such as those shown in Figure. Figure 1 (a) 
is a market that combines structure (x/y) (an individual sells x and buys y, and 
self-provides z and T) and 
(Please insert Figure 1 here) 
(a) Market P (b) Market B 
Figure 1 
structure (y/x) (an individual sells y and buys x, and self-provides z and T). We 
refer to this market as P. Figure 1 (b) is a market that combines structure (x/y 
z) (an individual sells x and buys y and z, and self-provides T), structure (y/x) 
(an individual sells y and buys x, and self-provides z and T) and structure (z/x) 
(an individual sells z and buys x, and self-provides y and T). We refer to this 
market as B. Note that some structures are not mutually consistent, e.g., 
structure (x/y) and (x/z) are not mutually consistent, i.e. there is no demand 
for x and no supply of y and z although there are supply of x and demand for y 
and z for a combination of these two structures. Therefore, a combination of 
(x/y) and (x/z) cannot constitute a market. 
In the analysis of competitive equilibrium, we will use the concept of a 
basic market. A basic market is defined as a market for which one cannot obtain 
another market by dropping any of its structure. In Figure 1, the two markets are 
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basic markets. However, a combination of structures (x/y z), (y/x z), (y/x) and 
(z/x) is not a basic market because we can obtain market Bin Figure 1 (b) by 
dropping structure (y/x z). 
Many structures can be combined with a basic market to obtain a new, 
non-basic market. For example, by combining market B with any of the other 6 
structures which do not involve trade in T and are not in market B we can obtain 
6 . .
~j=oci = 26 markets, where ci is j combination of 6 factors. For a basic market, 
the number of traded goods equals the number of structures. For a non-basic 
market, the number of traded goods is smaller than the number of structures. 
We will enumerate all possible markets, and solve for all candidate 
equilibria (corner equilibria), then find the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium 
and the full equilibrium. 
From the individual optimal decisions, the individual supply and demand 
functions for each structure can be derived. Let Mi be the number of individuals 
selling good i; market clearing conditions can be specified for each basic 
market. For example, if the market is P, a combination of structure (x/y) and 
structure (y/x), shown in Figure 1 (a), there are the market clearing conditions 
in market P 
(III-la) MX XS 
where Mx and My are the numbers of the individuals selling x and y, respectively. 
The individual budget constraints for the two component structures are 
(III-lb) Pxy x s Pxy x d 
where Pxy - Px/Py· One of these two equations implies the other due to Walras' 
law. 
From (III-la) and (III-lb), it can be derived that 
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(III-2) Pxy 
where r = Mx/My is the ratio of the number of individuals choosing structure 
(x/y) to the number of individuals choosing structure (y/x). We need solve only 
for the relative numbers of individuals choosing different structures because we 
can derive Mx = rM/(l+r) and My M/(l+r) from Mx+ My M. Hence, Mx and My can 
be found if r is known. 
According to the individual optimal decisions, xs and ys are constants 
depending upon a, b, c, a, fi, ~. s, and t. Hence, (III-lb) implies Pxy depends 
inversely on r. Inserting (III-2) into indirect utility functions in structures 
(x/y) and (y/x), the utilities may be expressed as functions of r. Setting U(x/y) 
U(y/x) , we have 
0(III-3) U(x/y) - r-P G(x/y) r G(y/x) - U(y/x) 
where G's depend on a, b, c, a, fi, ~. t, ands. The intersection of U(x/y) and 
U(y/x) determines a corner equilibrium value of r. Inserting the value of r back 
into utility function, (III-3) gives a corner equilibrium utility U*, which is 
real income as well as the real returns to labor in this market because of the 
assumption that each person has one unit of labor. 
For the category of non-basic markets, there is the following proposition: 
Proposition 2 
There does not exist a corner equilibrium for any non-basic market. 
For a non-basic market, there are m structures and n traded goods, and m > n. 
According to Appendix 1, in any optimal structure an individual sells at most one 
type of good. This implies that the types of structures selling the same type of 
good exceed one if m > n. The necessary conditions for a corner equilibrium lead 
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to m-1 conditions of utility equalization. These m-1 equations contain n-1 
relative prices. Noting the fact that these m-1 equations are log-linear, 
non-homogeneous, and independent of one another, this system has no consistent 
solution since m > n. Therefore, proposition 2 has been established. 
Noting the following two points, we can prove the existence of a corner 
equilibrium for a given basic market. 
(A) For a given basic market with n traded goods and n component structures, 
the individual supplies of all traded goods are constants and the individual 
demands for all traded goods are functions of relative prices. The indirect 
utility functions are determined only by relative prices of the traded goods. 
Letting the n indirect utility functions equal one another, we obtain (n-1) 
log-linear equations containing (n-1) relative prices. Again, noting that these 
equations are non-homogeneous and independent of one another, we can solve for a 
vector of log-relative prices. The relative prices are positive. 
(B) Given the relative prices solved in (A), (n-1) independent market 
clearing conditions can be transformed into a system of equations containing 
(n-1) relative numbers of individuals selling the different goods. This system 
looks like a system of linear equations associated with an input-output system. 
For example, in the market with three traded goods, such a system is 
(III-4a) fl -,8/(a+b)) fMyx Pyx Ys) f XS 1 
l XS J 
If the number of goods traded by individuals selling good z is less than that 
traded by the whole market, e.g. structure (z/x) trades two goods and structures 
(x/y,z) and (y/x,z) trade three goods, then (III-4a) becomes 
(III-4b) fl -,8/(a+,8)1 fMyx Pyx yS) 
l -1 1 J lMzx Pzx zsJ 
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where Mij = Mi/Mj is the relative number of individuals selling good i to those 
selling good j. Myx and Mzx are unknown. It is easy to see that the solution 
vector (Myx, Mzx)' for this kind of system of linear equations is positive. 
Considering the positiveness of equilibrium relative prices shown in (A), the 
positiveness of the solution of (III-4) guarantees the existence of corner 
equilibrium in a basic market. This leads us to 
Proposition 3 
There exists a corner equilibrium for any basic market. 
There are multiple corner equilibria. All these corner equilibria comprise a 
set of the candidates for equilibrium. These candidates satisfy the following 
conditions 
(i) All excess demands for goods are zero for uniform positive relative 
prices of goods and a uniform positive price of labor (the real returns to 
labor). 
(ii) Individuals maximize their utilities for given prices and for a given 
basic market. 
Note that we have not yet imposed full maximization by individuals at the 
moment since this can be done only when all candidates for equilibrium are 
enumerated. By enumerating all corner equilibria, we will find the Pareto optimum 
corner equilibrium and prove that it is a full equilibrium in the next two 
sections. 
IV. The Pareto Optimum Corner Equilibrium 
This section first proves that a corner equilibrium is Pareto efficient for a 
given basic market. Then, we prove that all non-basic markets are neither 
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equilibria nor Pareto optimal. Finally the relationship between the real return 
to labor in a corner equilibrium and the preference and technology parameters 
will be investigated. 
If the market is Pas shown in Figure 1 (a), i.e., some individuals choose 
structure (x/y) and other individuals choose structure (y/x), then we can derive 
the necessary conditions for a restricted Pareto efficient allocation from the 
problem in Appendix 2. By "restricted", we shall mean that the market is given. 
From the necessary conditions of that problem, it can be shown that the corner 
equilibrium found in sections II and III is the restricted Pareto optimum for the 
market. 
Following this procedure, we can show that each corner equilibrium is the 
restricted Pareto optimum for a given basic market. Moreover, Appendix 2 has 
proven 
Proposition 4 
Each corner equilibrium is Pareto efficient for a given basic market and all 
non-basic markets cannot satisfy the necessary conditions for the Pareto 
optimum. 
Combining this with proposition 2, we conclude that neither equilibrium, nor the 
Pareto optimum is associated with a non-basic market. This leads us to 
Proposition 5 
Both candidates for an equilibrium and for the Pareto optimum market are 
associated with some basic market. 
By comparing real returns to labor in different basic markets, we can find 
the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium; it is the corner equilibrium with the 
maximum real return to labor. This Pareto optimum corner equilibrium depends upon 
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t, sand the differences among (a,a), (b,fi), (c,1). 
Given the number of traded goods, it can be shown that (i) the corner 
equilibrium including as traded goods those with larger preference parameters is 
Pareto superior to that including as traded goods those with smaller preference 
parameters; and (ii) the co~ner equilibrium including as traded goods those with 
a high return to specialization is Pareto superior to that including as traded 
goods those with a small return to specialization. (i) and (ii) leads us to 
Proposition 6 
The corner equilibrium including as traded goods those with a large preference 
parameter has a greater real return to labor, and the corner equilibrium 
including as traded goods those with higher returns to specialization has a 
greater real return to labor. 
A proof to this proposition is in Appendix 3. 
Assume that a= b = c = t and a= fi = 1, then differences in the real returns 
to labor in various markets depends only upon the number of traded goods and 
service. The composition of traded goods has no effect on the real returns to 
labor. With this assumption, there are 5 possible market configurations: 
(1) Autarky. We refer to it as market A. This market consists of structure 
(x,y,z). 
(2) Partial division of labor in production. We refer to it as market P. This 
market consists of structure (x/y) and (y/x). 
(3) Complete division of labor in production. We refer to it as market C. 
This market consists of structure (x/yz), (y/xz) and (z/xy). 
(4) Partial division of labor in production and transaction. We refer to it 
as market PT. This market consists of structure (x/yT), (y/xT), and (T/xy). 
(5) Complete division of labor in production and transaction. We refer to it 
as market CT. This market consists of structure (x/yzT), (y/xzT), (z/xyT), and 
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(T/xyz). 
Having solved the corner equilibria in these five markets and compared the 
real returns to labor, we obtain 
Proposition 7 
(1) Fors (the average distance between a pair of neighbors)< 0.54, the real 
returns to labor in markets P and PT cannot be the maximum. 
(i) Market A has the maximum real return to labor if a < 
0.41-0.251og(l-1.414s). 
(ii) Market C has the maximum real return to labor if 
0.41-0.25log(l-1.414s) <a< 2.77-l.09log(l-1.732s). 
(iii) Harke t CT has the maximum real return to labor if 
2.77-l.09log(l-1.732s) < a. 
(2) For 0.54 < s < 0.58, the real return to labor in market P cannot be the 
maximum. 
(i) Market A has the maximum real return to labor if a < 
0.41-0.251og(l-1.414s). 
( ii) Market C has the maximum real return to labor if 
0.41-0.251og(l-l.414s) <a< 4.20-l.04log(l-1.414s). 
(iii) Harke t PT has the maximum real return to labor if 
4.20-1.041og(l-1.414s) <a< 2.77-1.091og(l-1.732s). 
(iv) Market CT has the maximum real return to labor if 2. 77-l.091og­
(1-1. 732s) < a. 
(3) For 0.58 < s < 0.71, the real returns to labor in markets P and CT cannot 
be the maximum. 
( i) Market A has the maximum real return to labor if a < 
0.41-0.251og(l-1.414s). 
( ii) Market C has the maximum real return to labor if 
0.41-0.251og(l-1.414s) <a< 4.20-1.041og(l-1.414s). 
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(iii) Harke t PT has the maximum real return to labor if 
4.20-l.04log(l-l.414s) < a. 
(4) Fors> 0.71, market A has the maximum real return to labor for any value 
of "a". 
Note, the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium has the maximum real return to 
labor. The next section will prove that all non-Pareto optimum corner equilibria 
are not full equilibria and that the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium is a full 
equilibrium. 
V. The Relationship Between the Equilibriwn and the Pareto Optimum 
This section will establish 
Proposition 8 
For an increasing returns economy, the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium is an 
equilibriwn and equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Moreover, the Pareto optimum 
allocation with equal utilities for all individuals is an equilibrium. 
Because all non-basic markets are incompatible with equilibrium and the 
Pareto optimum, only basic markets are concerned in proving this proposition. 
To prove this proposition, it suffices to establish that 
(1) if an equilibrium exists, it is an element of a set that consists of the 
corner equilibria in all basic markets; 
(2) the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium exists and is an equilibrium; 
(3) all non-Pareto optimum corner equilibria are not equilibria. 
On the basis of these three statements, it is trivial to show the final part 
of proposition 8 because the only difference between the Pareto optimum and 
equilibrium is that the former may have the utilities different from individual 
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to individual, but for the latter all people have equal utilities. 
It is easy to show (1) because the set of all markets includes all possible 
combinations of corner solutions for individual optimal decisions following the 
definition of a market. The equilibrium is certainly associated with an element 
of the market set since the definition of equilibrium requires optimization of 
individual decisions. This, combined with proposition 5, yields that the 
equilibrium, if it exists, is an element of a set that consists of the corner 
equilibria in all basic markets. 
To justify (2), we need to prove the existence of a Pareto optimum corner 
equilibrium and prove that this corner equilibrium satisfies the full 
maximization of individual utilities. Such full maximization will ensure that 
' 
this corner equilibrium is a full equilibrium because a corner equilibrium 
satisfies all conditions for equilibrium except ensuring optimal choice of 
structure by an individual. 
Propositions 3 and 5 can be used to justify the existence of a Pareto optimum 
corner equilibrium. 
The definition of a Pareto optimum corner equilibrium combined with 
proposition 4 implies that this corner equilibrium ensures the full maximization 
of individual utilities. Therefore, (2) can be proven. That is, there exists a 
Pareto optimum corner equilibrium and this corner equilibrium is an equilibrium. 
( 3) is easy to prove. Since the notion of equilibrium in this paper is 
extremely neoclassical, equilibrium has to ensure that each person chooses the 
corner solution that maximizes his utility. Non-Pareto optimal corner equilibria 
are not equilibria because in each of these equilibria every person's utility is 
not maximized with respect to his corner solutions. Proposition 8 can thus be 
established. 
This section has developed an approach to analyzing a model with increasing 
returns to specialization. Such an approach has been used to show that the 
equilibrium achieves a Pareto optimum. By solving for all corner equilibria, we 
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can analyze under what conditions the equilibrium will shift from one corner 
· equilibrium to another. Therefore, this approach is useful for analyzing the 
development of market structure and equilibrium. The next section applies this 
approach to investigate the comparative statics of this model. 
VI. EquilibriUJll and Its Comparative Statics 
Propositions 5, 7, and 8 lead us to 
Corollary 1 
For sufficiently smalls, increasing economies of specialization will case the 
equilibriUJll to evolve from autarky first to complete division of labor in 
production (market C), then jump to complete division in production and 
transaction (market CT). For sufficiently larges, equilibriWll is autarky for 
any degree of increasing returns to specialization. For the values of s in 
between, increasing economies of specialization will make equilibrium 
gradually evolve from autarky first to market C, then to market PT, finally to 
market CT. In this evolution, the goods with relatively large parameters of 
preference and degree of increasing returns to specialization will be traded 
before other goods are involved in the market. 4 
Here, "s" is the average distance between a pair of neighbors. Moreover, 
propositions 4, 5, and 6 lead us to 
Corollary 2 
For sufficiently large economies of specialization, decreasing "s" will 
involve more goods in the division of labor and the market. 
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The two corollaries tell us that the number of traded goods is determined by 
the absolute degree of increasing returns to specialization and the average 
distance between a pair of neighbors, while the composition of traded goods is 
determined by the relative degree of increasing returns to specialization and the 
relative preference for different goods. Also, the corollaries say that a 
sufficiently large degree of increasing returns to specialization in production 
as well as in transaction is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
division of labor, while a sufficiently smalls is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the division of labor. Sufficient increases in "a" as well as in 
"1/s" will produce a "take-off" of the division of labor and productivity. 
Moreover, these two corollaries mean that there is some substitution between 
"a" and 1/s. For example, if the degree of increasing returns to specialization 
is not large, then urbanization can promote the division of labor and 
productivity by increasing 1/s. If "a" is large, then we may still have the 
developed division of labor even if population is dispersed (large "s"). 
If the degree of increasing returns to specialization in production as well 
as in transaction is a sufficiently large constant, then urbanization can 
decrease "s," thereby producing a "take-off" of the equilibrium level of division 
of labor. This take-off will enhance trade dependence (the ratio of trade volume 
to income), the extent of market (demand for traded goods), and per capita real 
income (the real returns to labor, or real productivity). We have worked out the 
formula for these three variables in different markets. They are increasing when 
the market evolves to the complete division of labor from autarky ass decreases. 
Moreover, our model can be used to show that the following variables also change 
with the evolution. 
(1) Self-sufficiency decreases as specialization develops. 
(2) Diversification of the economy increases as the number of traded goods 
and professional sectors increase. 
(3) Degree of concentration of production increases as the total output share 
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of a traded good produced by one producer rises. 
(4) Degree of integration of the economy develops as the number of trade 
partners of each individual increases. 
(5) Transaction efficiency increases and the ratio of the value of 
transaction service (or roundabout production, or intermediate production) to the 
value of consumer goods increases as the division of labor evolves. 
All these phenomena, some of them apparently contradictory, are different 
versions of the evolution of division of labor. This evolution is caused by the 
increases in 1/s and a. 
In order to explore the difference between the theory of structural change 
proposed here from the conventional one, two examples are discussed. First, we 
compare our theory of structural change with the theory of Lewis and Fei and 
Ranis. According to Lewis [1955] and Fei and Ranis [1964], development is a 
process in which surplus labor in the agricultural sector is transferred to the 
industrial sector. Sufficient surplus of agricultural output is a necessary 
condition for starting this process. In order to compare their models with our 
theory, let us assume that in our model xis food, y is clothing, and z is house. 
If "a" is very small and s is very great, then our equilibrium is autarky. All 
individuals self-provide three goods and live scattered throughout the rural 
area. We can call this a traditional agricultural sector. In this economy each 
individual produces all goods he needs. A decrease in "s" generated by 
urbanization or an increase in "a" generated by a technical innovation will shift 
our equilibrium to the division of labor, e.g. to market CT. In this market the 
previous "natural agents" are changed to professional farmers, workers 
specializing in the production of clothing or housing, and professional traders 
producing T respectively. In this transition, we see that the professional 
farmers are less than the previous "natural agents" (producing all goods) and 
population is concentrated in urban areas. This looks like a shift of labor from 
the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. But this actually is a process 
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of the evolution of division of labor. Each individual switches to professional 
activity from self-sufficient activity. In autarky, low productivity is not 
because of "labor surplus", but because of the low level of division of labor. 
Hence, "labor surplus" as well as "surplus of agricultural products" are not 
necessary conditions for this shift of economic structure. From our theory 
proposed in this paper, the necessary conditions for this transition of economic 
structure are the sufficiently high degree of increasing returns to 
specialization (a, b, c, t) and sufficiently small "s". Therefore, the key issue 
for economic development and transition of economic structure is the initiation 
and speeding up of the evolution of the division of labor rather than the 
existence of a labor surplus. 
If "s" is interpreted as the transaction cost related to government 
interference with the market system, e.g., a trade tax and restrictions on market 
exchange, our model will tell us that a liberalization policy will substantially 
decrease "s" and raise the equilibrium level of division of labor thereby 
generating economic development. Indeed, such transaction costs imposed by a 
gave rnment in a less developed country are large and the success of 
liberalization policies in the development of "four small tigers" (Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, South Korea, and Singapore) is the best support for this theory. 
The second example is the theories of Kuznets [1966] and Chenery [ 1979] . 
According to their theory of structural changes, the transition of economic 
structure is based on an increase in per capita income. According to our theory, 
however, the increase in per capita income and all other phenomena listed above 
are different versions of the evolution of the division of labor. It does not 
make sense to explain one version of this evolution by another. This paper 
explains the evolution by the improvements of transaction efficiency resulting 
from changes in the level of urbanization, policy, or institutional arrangements 
and explains structural changes by this evolution. Yang [1988] explores a 
mechanism behind the evolution of the division of labor in the context of a 
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dynamic equilibrium model without exogenous changes in "a" and "s". 
Conclusions 
The major accomplishment in this paper is to distinguish increasing returns 
to specialization from increasing returns to scale and to develop a multiple-step 
approach to handling the model with increasing returns to specialization. Also, 
this paper shows that a competitive market can efficiently integrate economies of 
specialization (which is endogenous to individuals) into economies of division of 
labor in the whole society (which is exogenous to individuals). A free market 
endogenously determines an efficient level of division of labor by balancing a 
trade-off between increasing returns to specialization and transaction costs. In 
addition, the comparative statics of our model shed new light on urban economics 
and the issue of structural change. 
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Notes 
1. According to conventional microeconomics, the welfare frontier coincides with 
the PPF. 
2. This two-stage set up is just for convenience of exposition. In fact all these 
decisions are determined simultaneously. 
3. Many papers on international trade, e.g. Ethier [1986], show that in models 
with increasing returns to scale, there are multiple equilibria and some of 
them are unstable. In our model all corner equilibria except the Pareto 
optimum one are not full equilibria. This point distinguishes our model from 
the models with increasing returns to scale. 
4. Yang [1988] shows that introducing intermediate goods and the market for labor 
into the model in this paper, we can justify Coase's theory of the firm; while 
all results in this paper still hold. 
Appendix 1: The Choice of Structures 
This appendix proves proposition 1 in section II. First, the first part of 
this proposition is established. Asswne xd > 0; xd can be solved from the budget 
constraint. Inserting this expression of xd and the rearranged production 
function of x into the utility function yields 
(1-1) U = {~-xs+(l-K)(l-k)[xs+p (Ts-Td)/px+Py(Ys-yd)/px+Pz(zs-zd)/Pxl}a
T 
[y+(l-K)(l-k)yd]P [z+(l-K)(l-k)zd]~ 
Differentiating (l-1) with respect to xs yields 
(1-2a) BU/Bxs= -A[l-(1-K)(l-k)] < 0 
where O < (1-K) (1-k) < 1, and A is a positive magnitude independent of xs. 
Canceling yd or zd, or Td by using the budget constraint, it can be shown that 
(1-2b) 8U/8is < 0 if id> 0, i = x, y, z, T. 
(1-2) implies that the optimwn amount sold of a good is zero if an individual 
buys this good. In other words, an individual will not buy and sell a good at the 
same time. Asswne xd > 0 (this implies xs = 0 due to (1-2)); then the optimwn 
quantity sold of at least another good has to be positive because of the budget 
constraint. Without loss of generality, we suppose ys > 0. au/ays = 0 gives the 
necessary condition for the optimwn ys. Inserting this condition into 8U/8Lx and 
differentiating the resulting first order derivatives with respect to Lx again 
yields 
(1-3a) a2u;a~ > o if au;a1.x = o 
This implies that the optimwn value of Lx is either zero or one if xd > 0. Lx = 1 
conflicts the asswnption ys > 0, implied by the asswnption xd > 0, and requiring 
Ly> 0. Hence, (1-3a) means 
(1-3b) The optimwn value of Lx is zero if xd > 0 
In other words, an individual will not produce and purchase a good at the same 
time. This is just the first part of the above proposition. 
Next, the second part of the proposition is proven. · Without loss of 
generality, we asswne ys, zs > 0. Because i cannot be negative for i = x, y, z, T 
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and because is= 0 if id> 0 due to (1-2), it can be shown that yd= zd = 0 if 
ys, zs > 0. au/ays = au;azs = 0 gives the necessary conditions for the optimum ys 
and zs. Inserting these conditions into 8U/8Ly and differentiating the resulting 
first order derivatives with respect to Ly again yields 
(l-4a) a2u/8Ij > o if au;ary- = o 
This implies that the optimum value of Ly is either zero or one. Ly= 0 conflicts 
the assumption ys > 0, and Ly= 1 conflicts the assumption zs > 0. Hence, (l-4a) 
means 
(l-4b) ys and zs cannot be positive at the same time 
In other words, an individual will not sell two goods at the same time. This is 
just the second part of the above proposition. 
Appendix 2: Corner Equilibrium. and the Restricted Pareto Optimum 
If market is (P) in Figure 1 (a), i.e., some individuals choose structure 
(x/y), signified by subscript 1 and other individuals choose structure (y/x), 
signified by subscript 2, then we can obtain the necessary conditions for the 
Pareto efficient allocation from the problem below: 
(2-1) Max: 
xi, d z1,Y1• 
s
xl' Lx, T 
dY2, x2' z2, 
s 
Y2• Ly, Lz 
s.t. x1+xi ~ z1 (1-LT-Lx)c 
Y2+Y2 ~ z2 (1-LT-Ly)c T LTt 
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where u is a constant. The first order conditions are 























where the marginal rate of substitution between 
good i and j for individuals choosing structure k; MR.Tif 
the marginal rate of transformation between good i and j for individuals choosing 
structure k. 
These are just the necessary conditions for corner equilibrium. From the 
corner equilibrium for market A, solved in subsection I.B and I.C, we can derive 
that 
1 2 1 2 2MR.Syx/T = Py/Px = MRS yx T or MR.Syx = MR.Syx T 
This is just (2-2). From this equilibrium we can obtain (2-3) and (2-4) too. 
Actually, the relative number of individuals, r, is also a decision variable 
in the problem of Pareto efficient allocation. However, from the problem (2-1), 
we. can solve for the unique xi, x1, Y2, and yf; they determine a uniquer through 
the market clearing condition since the number of traded goods equals the number 
of structures in the basic market. 
For a non-basic market, e.g., that consists of structures (z/x y), (x/y z), 
(z/x y) , and (x/y) , we have a similar problem of Pareto optimal allocation as 
(2-1) which maximizes U(z/x y) subject to all individual production functions, 
transaction technologies, and balance between consumption and production giving 
that other utilities are not smaller than some constants. However, the relative 
numbers of individuals in structures (x/y z), and (x/y) are flexible. Name these 
two numbers as Mi and M2 respectively. For the relevant Lagrange function 
associated with this restricted optimization problem, IA, we can show 
(2-Sa) 8IA/8M1IMi=O ~ 0 if A8U(z/xy)/8x + B8U(z/xy)/8y ~ 0 
(2-Sb) 8IA/8M2IM2=0 ~ 0 if A8U(z/xy)/ax + B8U(z/xy)/ay ~ 0 
where we use the facts that M = ™i• Mis the total number of individuals, and Mi 
is the number of individuals in structure i. IA is the Lagrange function. 
(2-5) implies that for any value of A8U(z/xy)/ax + B8U(z/xy)/8y, the Pareto 
optimum requires either M1 = 0 or M2 = 0. In other words, this non-basic market 
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cannot satisfy the necessary condition for the Pareto optimum. 
Applying the above procedure to each market, we can show proposition 4 in 
section IV. 
Appendix. 3 A Proof to Proposition 6 
Assume, for example, that the market is P, as shown in Figure 1 (a); it is 
not difficult to show (i) the corner equilibrium including as traded goods those 
with larger preference parameters is Pareto superior to that including as traded 
goods those with smaller preference parameters; and (ii) the corner equilibrium 
including as traded goods those with great return to specialization is Pareto 
superior to that including as traded goods those with small return to 
specialization. 
( i) Assuming a: = {3 and a b c = t, we have utilities for structure 
(x/y) and (y/x): 
(3-la) logU(x/y) a:(2logx+logT-logr)+1logz+a:log(l-K) 
(3-lb) logU(y/x) a:(2logx+logT+logr)+1logz+a:log(l-K) 
where x [2a:/(3a:+1)]a/2, z = [1/(3a:+1)]a and T = [a:/(3a:+1)]a. The condition of 
utility equalization becomes 
(3-2) E = logU(x/y) - logU(y/x) = 2a:log r = 0. 
(i) will be established, if it can be shown that 
(3-3) dlogU*/da:la:=1 = 8logU*/da:la:=1 + (8logU*/8r*)(dr*/da:)la:=1 > 0. 
where U* is real income and r* = M*x/M*y is relative number of the individuals 
choosing different structures in the corner equilibrium. From (3-2) it can be 
derived that 
(3-4a) dr*/da:la:=1 = -(8E/8a)/(8E/8r*)la:=1 0 
where 8E/8ala:=1 = 2logr O because r = 1 if a: 1, and 
(3-4b) alogU*/80:la:=1 > 0. 
(3-4) ensures that (3-3) holds. (3-3) implies that if individuals prefer x 
and y to z, the corner equilibrium with x and y as traded goods will have a 
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greater real return to labor than that with x and z or with y and z as traded 
goods. 
(ii) Assuming a= p =~and a= b = t, (3-1) holds if x = [2a/(3a+c)]a/2, z = 
[c/ ( 3a+c)] c, and T [2a/(3a+c)]a. Also, there is the condition of utility 
equalization (3-2). 
(ii) will be established, if it can be shown that 
(3-5) dlogU*/dala=c = 8logU*/8ala=c + (8logU*/8r*)(dr*/da)la=c > 0. 
From (3-2) with x = [2a/(3a+c)]a/2, z = [c/(3a+c)]c, and T = [2aL/(3a+c)]a, it 
can be derived that 
(3-6) 8logU*/8ala=c > 0, and dr*/dala=c -(8E/8a)/(8E/8r*)la=c 0 
where 8E/8ala=c = 0. 
(3-6) ensures (3-5) to hold. (3-5) implies that if the returns to 
specialization in producing x and y are greater than that in producing z, then 
the corner equilibrium with x and y as traded goods will have a greater real 
return to labor than that with x and z or with y and z as traded goods. 
Proposition 6 can be established by using (i) and (ii). 
V 
'i. 
I-
